(OT?) Re: Zsh configuration files

["Benjamin R. Haskell" <zsh@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Tue, 25 Nov 2008, Allan Caffee wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 5:33 PM, Benjamin R. Haskell <zsh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > Long ago, I set some things up for easily sharing my Zsh startup 
> > scripts between various computers I use. I did most of this when I was 
> > still fairly new to Zsh, so some things might have easier/better ways 
> > to do them, but this is how I set mine up. Some features:
> >
> > 1. Automatically runs any files matching .zsh_* in my home dir, 
> > excluding vim swap files
> >
> > 2. For running as root, I can just link my normal-user .zshrc and 
> > .zshenv files, and it'll detect that they're linked, and use the .zsh_* 
> > files from my normal-user directory
>
> That sounds really dangerous.  You're offering a hook for someone to 
> execute arbitrary code as root.  If someone breaks your user account 
> they could for example add a file in your home directory that resets the 
> root password or does some other really mean things.  If you want root 
> to have the same setup as your regular user you should put it somewhere 
> that only root can write.

I was thinking about that as I posted to the list, and since you pointed 
it out, maybe I'll get some general feedback... (sorry if this is too 
off-topic)

Like many users (I suspect), most of the systems I'm talking about here 
are essentially single-user systems. I log in under a normal user account, 
but the only reason not to log in as root is 'rm -rf /' protection. (i.e. 
so as to not cause unintentional damage.) On other systems, either:

1) I don't have root access, so this doesn't apply

2) The systems are properly secured (running/behind a firewall, 
non-essential services are off, passwords are strong, system is kept 
up-to-date, and I only ever log in to my normal account via SSH with keys) 
[modulo, of course, this discussion]

Am I really setting myself up for badness via this automated .zsh_* stuff?

And even beyond those reasons... I always got the impression that someone 
capable of using exploit X to break into a normal user's account had a 
pretty low barrier to using exploit Y to elevate their privileges to root. 
Is that not generally the case? [i.e. a system is only secure as its least 
secure user]

Best,
Ben