Re: zsh/files module and insecure tempfile creation

[Bart Schaefer <schaefer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Jan 12,  5:43am, Daniel Shahaf wrote:
} Subject: Re: zsh/files module and insecure tempfile creation
}
} Bart Schaefer wrote on Fri, Jan 09, 2015 at 22:31:50 -0800:
} > Next the attacker must be able to swap the directory or symlink with
} > a symlink to his own target file.
} 
} On FreeBSD systems, 'cat /path/to/dir' works (prints something and
} returns 0).

That is also avoided, I think, by using zf_ln -fn to be sure the target
is removed and replaced by zsh's temp file.  I think we're OK there after
this latest patch pass.